Articles

Final Return Home:
1Lt Michael J. Blassie (04 April 1948 - 11 May 1972)

On 11 May 1972, 1st Lt Michael J. Blassie was flying as wingman to Major James Connally in A-37B tail number 69-6345 on a ground attack mission in support of ARVN troops besieged in the town of An Loc. Blassie was making an attack run on NVA positions about 2 miles northwest of the ARVN perimeter when he was hit by 23mm AAA fire. Major Connally and a Forward Air Controller watched as Blassie's A-37 rolled inverted, crashed, and exploded. There were no signs of ejection, no parachute was sighted, and no emergency radio signals were heard. The crash area was in enemy-occupied territory and an immediate recovery attempt was impossible. Because of the circumstances - eyewitnesses and the absence of any evidence that he had escaped his aircraft - 1st Lt Blassie was classed as Killed in Action. It should be noted that a number of US aircraft had been shot down in the vicinity of An Loc, including an AH-1G (with the loss of two crewmen) on 11 May.

In October 1972 ARVN forces regained control of the area where Blassie had crashed and fragmentary human remains were recovered from the crash site. Although aircrew-related objects also were recovered, it was decided that then-available techniques were inadequate to confirm that the human remains could be positively identified as those of 1st Lt Blassie, although they were those of a Caucasian who was similar in age and stature to Blassie.

In the early 1980s a decision was taken to inter the remains of an unidentified Vietnam casualty in the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery. In 1984, the selected remains - those recovered from the vicinity of the A-37 crash - were interred with due ceremony as the Vietnam War's Unknown Soldier.

A decade later, questions concerning the identity of the Vietnam Unknown Soldier were raised. It was argued that the crew-associated equipment was sufficient to rule out the possibility that the remains recovered in October 1972 were those of a helicopter, C-130, or AC-119 crewman - leaving only the possibility that they belonged to the pilot of the A-37.

The remains were disinterred from the Tomb of the Unknowns in May 1998 for DNA testing, and at the end of June 1998 the Secretary of Defense announced that the DNA tests demonstrated that the remains were indeed those of First Lieutenant Blassie. Formal identification was announced on 08 July 1998 following the Blassie family's acceptance of the identification.

On 10 July 1998 the 8th Special Operations Squadron, now flying MC-130 aircraft, transported 1st Lt Blassies remains to Saint Louis for burial with full honors in the Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery.

Burial of Lt. Blassie (1998)

A lthough Blassie's remains were recovered later that year, positive identification couldn't be made at the time -- partially due to an administrative SNAFU -- and the remains were reclassified as "unknown." On Memorial Day 1984, Blassie's remains were placed in Arlington National Cemetery's Tomb of the Unknowns. In May 1997, Lt. Blassie's body was disinterred to undergo DNA testing and identified with a "99.9-percent degree of certainty."

Lt. Blassie's body was flown home to St. Louis on a MC-130E of the 8th SOS from Hurlburt Field -- Returning one of their own home in July 1998. (Go to Return home for the full story.)

The following story was excerpted from Air Magazine, Sep 98: Unknown, No More by Tech. Sgt. Pat McKenna:

He was a faceless patriot "known but to God..." and laid to rest in the country's most hallowed ground.
Today 1st Michael J. Blassie is...

Unknown, No More

Jean Blassie treasures the one and only set of fine china she’s ever owned. The 12-place setting made by Noritake of Japan is pearl white and ringed with blue flowers. She proudly displays her trove behind glass in an oak hutch in a modest and tidy apartment in Florissant, Mo., a suburb of St. Louis. Not a single piece is missing, broken or even chipped.

Mrs. Blassie rarely uses the dishes, saving them for special occasions like Thanksgiving, Christmas and Easter. She’s never needed to scold her children to treat them with care. They’d seen their mother delicately handle and guard each piece, gently cradling the porcelain plates like a newborn baby ... so they knew.

“The dishes are precious to me,” she said. “Michael sent them.” Michael, the eldest of her five children, shipped the dishes from South Vietnam in the spring of 1972. The china came home safely without so much as a scratch. Michael never came home, though.

On May 11, 1972, North Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns sliced apart Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie’s A-37 attack jet while it made a low-level bombing run near An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon.

Maj. James Connally, the flight lead, craned his head back in time to see Blassie nosedive into a thick jungle of rubber trees and watched his wingman’s plane explode on impact.

“It’s a snapshot that will forever be imbedded in my brain,” said Connally, now a retired colonel living in Bethesda, Md. “I knew he didn’t make it. He was the first and last man I’d ever lose in combat, and I felt deeply responsible. For the past 26 years, I’ve thought of Michael Blassie often, and I’ve asked myself what I could’ve done differently. I have no answers.”

A knock at the door

The Friday before Mother’s Day, a pair of Air Force officers in dress uniforms waited in the lobby of North St. Louis Trust Company for Jean Blassie to return from lunch. The officers, one of them a chaplain, had already “regretfully informed” her husband, George, a meat-cutter at the McHenry Meat Co.

“They brought me into the bank’s conference room, told me the news and then took me home. And that’s all I want to say about that day,” she says.

A neighbor picked up 11-year-old George Jr., the youngest of the children, from Mark Twain Elementary School.

“I was so excited about skipping the rest of the school day,” said George, now a 37-year-old supermarket customer service manager from St. Peters, Mo. “I kept asking Mrs. Leeser, ‘Why am I going home?’ I thought it had to be something good, but then I saw the official Air Force vehicles parked out front. Although I didn’t know much about Vietnam or the military, I knew something was wrong.”

A month later, the china arrived at the Blassie’s doorstep. And days before that a box of chocolate chip cookies that Mrs. Blassie had baked and mailed to Michael for his 24th birthday returned unopened from Vietnam. Michael never returned, though.

Fierce fighting in An Loc stalled a search party from surveying the crash site for six months. When a South Vietnamese patrol finally reached the wreckage, soldiers found Lieutenant Blassie’s military ID card, dog tags, survival gear, Vietnamese money, a tattered parachute, the remnants of a flight suit and a scant set of human remains: part of a pelvis, four ribs and an upper arm bone. On the trip back to the States, Blassie’s ID and dog tags vanished, a snafu later serving to muddy identification.

Despite the mix-up, the Pentagon tagged the bones as “believed to be” Blassie. Forensic tests in 1978 by the Army’s Central Identification Lab in Hawaii, however, suggested the remains weren’t Blassie’s after all. The blood type and size of the bones didn’t match the lieutenant’s so the Army removed the “believed to be” designation. The Pentagon reclassified the remains as unidentifiable, cataloging them as “X-26, Case 1853.” Accordingly, Blassie’s status reverted to “killed in action, body not recovered.” Then in 1984, the Defense Department interred “X-26” in the nation’s most hallowed ground – the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery. Representing the Vietnam War dead, the relics recovered from An Loc joined unknowns from three previous wars: World Wars I and II, and the Korean War.

A white marble sarcophagus crowns the sacred shrine. Chiseled above it reads the epitaph, “Here rests in honored glory an American soldier known but to God.” As tradition prescribes, the government destroyed all documents concerning the selection of the “unknown” to preserve the tomb’s sanctity and its air of anonymity.

Suffering in silence

Meanwhile, Jean Blassie silently grieved. For 10 years, she couldn’t even bear to speak Michael’s name. No one could share her pain. No one could soothe a mother’s heartache. No one could answer her questions: Was Michael still alive? Was he a prisoner? Was he injured or lost in the jungle? Was he going to walk through the front door someday and surprise them all? No one could answer her, so she never asked. Since the day she lost him more than two decades ago, she said she’s gone to bed every night wondering where Michael might be.

“In my heart, I knew he was gone, but there’s always that doubt,” said Mrs. Blassie, who has allowed herself to cry three times for her son. “There’s always ‘what if?’ ”

George Blassie Sr. suffered, as well, in muted agony. And because he needed to stay strong for his family, he swallowed his emotions. But Michael was special to him. He was his first born, and he had made it! He became the first Blassie to go to college, graduating from the Air Force Academy no less. As a former Army Air Corps staff sergeant who fought during World War II, he beamed when his boy pinned on his second lieutenant bars.

And when Michael didn’t return, father saluted son by raising a flagpole in the front yard of their home on Paddlewheel Drive in Florissant. He hoisted a garrison-sized American flag, which he illuminated by spotlight, and let wave night and day for almost 20 years. Then George died in 1991, never to learn his son’s ultimate fate.

“My father never really recovered from my brother’s death,” said Pat Blassie, one of Michael’s three sisters. “He kept all of Michael’s pictures, medals and awards in a display case in the basement. When he came home from work, he’d go sit downstairs for the evening and look at Michael’s things.”

Pat serves in the Air Force Reserve as a captain in the Pentagon. While on her tours in Washington, she’s paid several visits to the Tomb of the Unknowns, never aware that she stood beside her brother’s grave and never aware when President Ronald Reagan eulogized the Unknown Soldier during his interment on May 28, 1984, that he spoke of Michael.

The president said, “We may not know of this man’s life, but we know of his character. We may not know his name, but we know his courage. He is the heart, the soul and the spirit of America.”

Knowing the unknown

Today, thanks to modern science, we now know his name and much more. Earlier this year, a CBS television report revealed evidence that Michael was indeed buried in the Tomb of the Unknowns. The family gathered at their mother’s home and decided unanimously to petition the Department of Defense to reanalyze the remains.

Wishing to ease the Blassies’ burden and put lingering doubts to rest, Secretary of Defense William Cohen honored their request. On May 14, the family witnessed the exhumation in Arlington, watching as an honor guard placed the silver coffin into a hearse, before it left for the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Rockville, Md. A bugler played “Taps” as the motorcade sped away.

Using mitochondrial DNA testing, a procedure approved for use only in 1995, the lab determined with a 99.9 percent degree of certainty that “X-26” was Michael Blassie. The unknown’s DNA matched perfectly with all 610 “markers” from Jean’s and sister Judy Cozad’s DNA samples. When the Blassies learned of the lab’s findings, it whipped up a tsunami of feelings.

“You think you’ve dealt with something, but you realize that you never did,” Pat said. “It’s like he died yesterday. We’re crying about things we never cried about and sharing thoughts we never shared before. I think my mother has expressed her emotions more in the last seven months than she’s ever done in her whole life.”

In the process, they’ve also rediscovered Michael and have gotten to know him better. They dragged shoeboxes crammed with his letters down from the attic, and together read his dispatches from Vietnam. Never once did the lieutenant moan about his problems or complain about dangers he faced. “He didn’t want to worry us,” his mother said. “He’d write things like ‘Hi. How are you? I’m doing fine,’ or tell little George to eat his vegetables. Nothing important, really.”

In a letter to his girlfriend, Lou Adams Pennebaker, he tried explaining how he felt about duty and mission. “Why am I trying to live if I am just living to die? I’ll keep on living to fight as long as there’s a fighting reason to live or for others to live,” he wrote.

Then there are the pictures. On this particular day, the Blassies huddled around their mother’s dining room table, flipping through scrapbooks and photo albums while Pat’s purring Himalayan cat slinked between their legs and Jean’s canary chirped noisily in the living room.

The pictures show “Michael the altar boy,” who helped Father Halleman with communion at Our Lady of Perpetual Help, and “Michael the Boy Scout,” who devoured Superman comic books and possessed a bottomless stomach, one that he enjoyed stuffing with German chocolate cake and Rice Krispies with bananas.

There’s “Michael the musician” blowing the bassoon at St. Louis University High School, where he earned a music scholarship, and “Michael the jock,” who captained the Air Force Academy soccer team and lettered in tennis.

Dozens of snapshots portray “Michael the doting brother,” Michael lugging little George on his shoulders while the three sisters dangle from big brother’s arms; Michael coaching his siblings through calisthenics and jogs around the block; and Michael quizzing George on his multiplication tables while the rest of the family decorates the Christmas tree.

Then there are images of “Michael the officer,” the academy cadet, reeking of Brut cologne, posing by his red MGB convertible before graduation in 1970; Michael puffing his chest out while his parents pin silver wings on it at Columbus AFB, Miss., and Michael, sporting a jaunty mustache barely within regs, grinning beside his A-37.

During his last conversation with Michael, George, then age 10, recalls pointing to a photograph of an A-37, asking him how hard it would be to shoot down. “He told me, ‘It would be almost impossible. You’d have to shoot that guy right there in the cockpit,’ ” George said. “That left me with some sense of security. The cockpit was so tiny. Michael would be safe.”

Blaze of glory

But the pilot that squadron mates called “Blaze” soon learned the skies above Southeast Asia were less than friendly. Assigned to the 8th Special Operations Squadron at Bien Hoa Air Base near Saigon, Blassie flew 132 combat missions, eventually earning an Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters, and posthumously receiving the Silver Star, Purple Heart and Distinguished Flying Cross. In the spring of 1972 during the Easter offensive, communist troops laid siege to the provincial capital of An Loc, strangling its population of 20,000. Lieutenant Blassie flew about three missions a day under hostile fire, to keep heat off South Vietnamese “RVN” troops defending An Loc.

On May 11, Air Force B-52s pounded enemy positions around An Loc every 55 minutes. In response, the communists set up clusters of anti-aircraft batteries. By that afternoon, the enemy had shot down a Vietnamese Air Force A-1, an Army Cobra helicopter, two O-2 planes, and Blassie’s A-37 Dragonfly.

The day after the shootdown, 1st Lt. Thomas “Doc” Waskow, an academy classmate of Blassie’s, hedgehopped over the crash site, peering down from his O-2 Skymaster and scanning the jungle for signs of life. But he saw nothing. For the next month, he monitored the “guard” band, the emergency channel, on his aircraft radio. But he heard nothing. Waskow, however, persisted in his crusade to bring Michael and others like him home.

“Never in the history of our country have we left our own on the battlefield, and we weren’t going to break those values in Vietnam, so the search continued,” said Waskow, now a major general and AIRSOUTH chief of staff. “Servicemembers know that regardless of their fate on the battlefield, they’ll finally come home and we’ll never forget their sacrifice.”

Today, 2,087 Americans from the Vietnam War remain unaccounted for.

On July 11, 1998, Michael Blassie’s journey ended. His family buried him near his father’s plot in Missouri soil on the banks of the Mississippi River. At Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery, he received a hero’s welcome.

As a solemn crowd of onlookers, many quietly weeping, took off their hats and bowed their heads, the Air Force honor guard fired a 21-gun salute that echoed off the cemetery’s stone walls and a flight of F-15 fighters roared overhead in the missing-man formation. More than 3,000 people paid their respects, including, among others, congressmen, Defense Secretary William Cohen and veterans.

Airman 1st Class Michael Leonard inspected the folded American flag that had been draped on the lieutenant’s coffin and crisply handed it to Gen. Michael Ryan, Air Force chief of staff, who in turn presented it to Mrs. Blassie. As a member of the Air Force Honor Guard, Leonard’s lost count of the exact number of funerals he’s participated in over the last two years, guessing it’s in the “thousands.”

“I can think of no greater honor,” Leonard said. “I felt privileged to carry Lieutenant Blassie’s casket and to fold the flag for his family. With so many funerals, so many caskets and so many bereaved families dressed in black, you sometimes forget why you’re doing it. Now I remember why.” After the funeral, family and friends talked of “healing old wounds,” of “coming full circle” and “closing open chapters in their lives.” And they spoke of “closure.”

Conversely, others have criticized the Blassies’ actions, saying the family committed an act of desecration in their quest to have the Tomb of the Unknowns opened and disturbed.

“We’ve been asked, ‘What is so important about just six bones?’ ” Pat said. “Well, he’s our brother, first of all. And he wasn’t unknown. And he didn’t belong there. But really, it falls back to our mother. She told us, ‘Bring my Michael home.’ ”

George added, “He’s a great man, and I’m proud of him. My brother deserves to be known.” The day after the funeral the Blassies returned to the cemetery to spend a few private moments alone with Michael. Jean Blassie stooped beside her boy’s grave, heaped with flowers, miniature American flags, POW/MIA mementos and messages.

She rested her age-worn hand on top of the white marble marker, gently and tenderly caressing it like a piece of her fine china. And she said silently, “My son is home. My son is finally home.”

A-37, Flying and Operating The following is a funny article on the idiocyncracies of the A-37 written by Dennis Selvig. To fully appreciate the maintenance humor, you'd have to been associated with aircraft in combat and know the types of pranks and antics of the pilots and maintenance folks played on one another. The problems dealing with "night vision" have been the subject of aviator tales dating back to World War II -- and the A-37 pilot was no different. And what combat tale would be complete without the ones dealing with gremlins and grinchs in the hung-ordnance. These vignettes are classics.

A-37, Flying and Operating

The A-37 had its own unique characteristics. Some of them were very interesting.

By Dennis Selvig

The Sky Blue DragonFly

The Air Force wanted to find out if ground fire was aimed or just random shooting into the air (barrage). They decided to paint a few of the A-37s in a sky blue (almost powder blue) color to see if the paint job would make any difference in the number of hits the bird took. They always paired the sky blue aircraft with a regular (camo) painted bird so they could have a good comparison. This was all very scientific.

There were several lessons learned from this exercise. First, it didn't make any difference what color the aircraft was. The sky blue ones picked up just as many hits (barrage fire). Second, it usually came back with all it's bombs on board because the FAC's couldn't see it and wouldn't clear it to drop. Third, the wingman better be flying it because if you scheduled it as lead it often came back alone. The wingman couldn't see it to rendezvous after the strike.

Those intake screens

The engines had screens that covered the intakes when the plane was taxiing. The idea was to protect the engines from FOD, since the intakes were so close to the ground. As soon as you got airborne and pulled up the gear handle, the screens would swing down and you would have an extra shot of thrust due to the restriction being removed from the intake. This was all fine and dandy except for formation take offs. You had to put the screens down manually after you lined up so that you wouldn't get out of synch as each of you lifted off. It was better when there was no confusion about who had the lead.

The screens did come in handy now and then. My roommate was in the arming area one rainy night on a scramble from Bien Hoa. When the crew chief showed him the arming streamers to confirm they were all out, the chief stood a little close to the aircraft and his poncho got sucked up against the left screen. Not to worry, after the RPM sagged enough the vacuum lessened and the chief was able to pull his poncho free and the war resumed.

Unpressurised Cockpit

The coolest thing about the unpressurised cockpit was that you got to smell gun smoke when strafing. There were some disadvantages however. For instance, when air refueling from a leaking basket, the JP-4 would run up the windshield and drip through the canopy seal onto your flight suit.

The Blast Deflector

The gun's blast deflector was built to vent the gun gasses straight up. The idea was to keep them from going into the right intake and causing corrosion problems. This made night strafing a little interesting. When you squeezed the trigger you got a very bright series of flashes about six feet away at your right front quarter. It was bright enough to ruin your dark adaptation and make it hard to see well enough to recover the plane. The solution was to close one eye when you shot (I always shot better that way anyhow), then open up that eye when you release the trigger and recover the plane using your "good" eye. Yankee ingenuity can lick any problem.

The Armament Panel

The A-37A model was famous for getting weapons released in various strange ways. Sometimes it was the pilot's fault, sometimes it was the panel's. In any case, if you managed to drop everything off one side while retaining everything on the other wing, you had your hands full recovering the plane. It usually took both hands on the stick and the stick as far to one side as you could hold it to keep the wings somewhat level and pull out.

The Emergency Engine Ignition Switch

Crew Chiefs liked to have fun too. They figured out that one could lift up the red cover guard on the Emergency Ignition Switch, turn it from NORMAL to OFF, and then lower the cover carefully without flipping the switch back to NORMAL.

This would make the engine start sequence quite a puzzle for most pilots. Lack of a light-off created a real funny look on the pilot's face as he scanned the gauges and switches to find the cause of the problem. He would usually slap the red cover down without fully appreciating the consequences of his action. The moaning and groaning of the engine, the clock-wise rotation of the EGT gauge, and a 20 foot long flame out the back would usually cause a red tinge on his face that matched the color of the flame.

Working with a FAC that never worked the A-37 before

Many FACs liked to orbit over the target. It made it easy to drop the nose and put in another mark or observe the hits and correct for the next fighter. The fast movers would fly under the FAC during their pullout, but the Dragonfly would pull up so quickly that it came through the FAC's altitude as it crossed over the target. Of course the lacking in a FAC's tactical experience would only become evident as you flipped off the Master Arm and looked up to see a windscreen full of Oscar Duck.

More Fun With the FAC

Rap - "Rap 21 in hot." Rustic - "No joy Rap. Where ya in from?" Rap - "Straight up." Rustic - "AHhhhhhhh..... . . . . . OK, cleared hot." (Strafing from a loop sure was fun).

VNAF A-37s Attack Ton Sonhut AB

Captured A-37 on display in Vietnam

Appendix:

GENERAL PURPOSE BOMBS.

a. Design

General purpose (GP) bombs are designed to provide both blast and fragmentation effects. The most extensively used GP bombs are the 500, 750, and 1,000 pound munitions. For special missions, 2,000 lb GP and 3,000 lb demolition bombs may be available also. GP bombs of 500 and 750 pounds can be delivered in a low or high drag configuration.

b. Effectiveness

Examples of effectiveness for various fuze options are shown below as crater widths and depths for several fuze/bomb combinations (earth detonated). In general, if blast and fragmentation effects are desired (personnel and materiel targets), proximity fuzes, fuze extenders, or instantaneous fuzing should be requested. If cratering or destruction is desired (roads, low bridges, or bunkers), appropriate short fuze delays should be requested. These crater dimensions apply only to the low drag configuration discussed in the subparagraph below; cratering efficiency will be significantly reduced for high drag bombs, because of less penetration.

Cratering Effects

Note that three figures for crater diameter and crater width are given for each type of ordnance and these correspond to soil types soft/medium/hard.

Ordnance	Optimum Fuze Delay	Striking Velocity	Angle of Penetration	Crater Diameter	Crater Depth
Mk 81 (250# GP)	0.01	1000 fps	58°	32/ 19/ 10	14/ 6/ 2
MK 82 (500# GP)	0.01	1000 fps	58°	40/ 23/ 14	17/ 7/ 2
M117 (750# GP)	0.01	1000 fps	58°	48/ 26/ 16	21/ 9/ 3
M117 (750# GP)	0.025	1000 fps	58°	--/ 35/ 18	--/ 7/ 3
MK 84 (2000# GP)	0.025	1000 fps	58°	72/ 49/ 26	32/ 13/ 4

c. Low Drag Bombs.

(1) General. Low drag bombs (slicks) are cylindrical and are equipped with conical fins for external carriage on fighter aircraft. They have nose and tail fuzing to increase functioning reliability and to obtain the desired terminal effects (ie. blast, fragmentation or cratering.)

(2) Delivery. Low drag bombs will normally be delivered from a 20°- 60° dive angle. Level deliveries between 500' and 2000' AGL are possible for 750# and smaller bombs but optical sighting system limitations degrade the accuracy of such deliveries. Twenty degree dive deliveries require a ceiling of about 4000' and a visibility of about three miles. However, deliveries can be made with a ceiling of 2000 feet. The following table provides estimates of combat delivery accuracies for low drag bombs.

BOMB TYPE	Aircraft Dive Angle	AGL-Feet	Knots True Airspeed	REP-Feet	DEP-Feet	CEP-Feet
MK82, M117	All Jet	45°	4500	500	200	140	300
MK84, M118	All Jet	45°	4500	500	200	140	300
MK82, M117	A-1	30°	2500	450	160	90	220
MK82, M117	A-1	30°	2000	325	110	70	160

Methods of measuring delivery accuracy are Range Error Probable (REP), Deflection Error Probable (DEP) and Circular Error Probable (CEP). REP is half the range distance between two points, equidistant from the target, that contains 50% of the impact points. BEP is half the lateral distance between two points, equidistant from the target, that contains 50% of the impact points. CEP is equal to the radius of a circle around the target which contains half the impact points.

(3) Fuzing. The terminal effects obtained from a high explosive bomb are determined by its fuzing. Low drag bombs can be fuzed for instantaneous or delayed detonations after impact. Low drag bombs are usually configured with both a nose and tail fuze and the pilot has the capability of selecting either one or both fuzes. Therefore, if a bomb has one fuze with an instantaneous element and the other with a delay element, the pilot can select either instantaneous or delay fuzing as desired.

Fuzes compatible with the bombs and other munitions listed here include impact, proximity, and airburst time fuzes. Where a munition is limited to use with only one of these specific fuze classifications, it will be so noted in the weapon data. Reliability, safety features, weapon effects, and delivery considerations vary with the type of fuze used; consequently, selection of the proper fuzing is as vital as selection of the bombs themselves.

• (a) Impact Fuzes. These fuzes initiate the fuze-bomb explosive train upon impact. Actual detonation of the bomb may be instantaneous or may be delayed through the use of pyrotechnic delay elements in the fuze. On M904 and M905 fuzes, instantaneous functioning or short delay elements (0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.25 seconds) may be preselected on the ground. M906 tail fuzes provide a medium delay of 12 seconds. The FMU-72 long delay fuze provides selectable delays up to 36 hours.
• (b) Proximity Fuzes. These fuzes are designed to burst a munition at a preset distance above the target. Proximity fuzes contain a radar transmitting and receiving unit which operates on the doppler principle. Low altitude (0 to 50') and high altitude (50' to 3000') proximity fuzes are in the inventory. (Note: The available World War II proximity fuzes are low speed delivery and have very poor reliability.)
• (c) Airburst Time Fuzes. These fuzes contain a mechanical or electric timer which is initiated upon release and airbursts the bomb after the preset time interval. This type fuze is generally used on dispenser munitions, bomb clusters, photoflash, leaflet bombs, etc.
• (d) M1A1 36" Fuze Extender. This fuze extender, commonly called the "Daisy Cutter" consists of an explosive filled length of steel tubing. The extender is installed in the nose fuze well adapter booster and an instantaneous fuze is installed in the forward end of the extender. An inertial non-delay fuze may be installed in the tall fuze well. This arrangement detonates the bomb above ground, and improves both blast and fragmentation effects. It is very effective when used against enemy troop concentrations even in forested areas. When fuze extenders are used, minimum safe distance from friendly troops is increased. Until more accurate data are provided, double the published minimum safe distances when employing fuze extenders.

d. High Drag Bombs.

(1) General. High drag bombs are MK 82 (500#) and M117 (750#) bombs with the conical tail fin removed and folding retarding fins installed. These fins open after the bomb is released to provide the aircraft safe separation from the blast and fragmentation effects of the bomb. This provides the fighter aircraft with the capability to deliver ordnance under low weather conditions. Also, because of reduced slant ranges at release, the high drag bomb can usually be more accurately delivered than the low drag bomb.

(2) Delivery. High drag bombs will normally be delivered from 10° - 20° dive angles with releases 500-1,000 feet, AGL. This will require a ceiling of 2,000-4,000 feet and a visibility of 2-3 miles. Aircraft are vulnerable to small arms and light AAA fire during the delivery of high drag bombs. Therefore, low drag bombs should be used wherever possible and high drag bombs used only when weather or other situations dictate. The following table provides an estimate of the combat delivery accuracy for high drag bombs.

BOMB TYPE	Aircraft Dive Angle	Knots True Airspeed	Release Altitude (Feet)	REP-Feet	DEP-Feet	CEP-Feet
Snakeye and M117 Retarded	All	20°	450	800'	100	50	130

(3) Fuzing. The high drag bombs are double fuzed, nose and tail. The nose fuze for a high drag bomb is the same as that of a low drag bomb and can provide the same delays. The tail fuze provides only an instantaneous detonation. If a delay is desired, the tail fuze will not be used.


Dropping Napalm.

NAPALM.

Napalm or "fire bombs" are cylindrical, thin skinned aluminum tanks filled with various types of incedigel mixes. It is one of the most versatile tactical fighter weapons since pilots have considerable leeway in delivery accuracy and need only insure that ordnance impacts are short of the target by about one-half the effective pattern length. Even with a near miss, napalm can be highly destructive to personnel, and to equipment that is vulnerable to its effects. Fuzing consists of an impact fuze which ejects white phosphorus (WP) into the splash pattern. Napalm cannisters have fuze igniters installed in both nose and tail. Napalm is available as 500# and 750# munitions and can be delivered in the unfinned or finned configuration. The napalm flame pattern may be as large as 40x180 meters when delivered from low altitude at high speed. Best delivery is parallel to friendly troop positions.

a. Unfinned Napalm.

(1) General. Unfinned napalm bombs are unstable after release with random tumbling until impact. Impact ruptures the napalm can and spreads the napalm mix over an area forward of the impact point.

(2) Delivery. Unfinned napalm is usually delivered from low (0° - 20°) dive angles, low (50' - 800' AGL) altitudes and high (up to 500 knots, depending on aircraft) speed. Delivery can be conducted under ceilings as low as 800' – 1000' AGL with visibilities of 2 to 4 miles (The lower visibility is for slower aircraft). A-1 aircraft may deliver unfinned napalm in dives up to 45°.

b. Finned Napalm.

(1) General. Finned napalm has predictable ballistics which allow accurate delivery from high dive angles and altitudes. As dive angle or release altitude increases, however, the pattern size decreases and effectiveness is reduced.

(2) Delivery. Finned napalm is better suited for penetration of jungle canopies than unfinned napalm when delivered from dive angles of 20° or greater.

c. Delivery Accuracy.

The following table provides an estimate of combat delivery accuracy for napalm:

Aircraft	Angle	Knots True Airspeed	Above Ground Level (Feet)	REP-Feet	DEP-Feet
All	0°	450	100	100	20

d. Napalm Mixtures:

(1) Napalm. Napalm is a mixture of gasoline and M-4 thickener which tends to adhere to a target. Napalm burns for approximately 15 to 30 seconds at temperatures up to 1400° F and is effective against combustible or partially combustible targets and those targets which can be damaged by intense heat. This category of targets includes: parked aircraft, vehicles, ammunition and supply depots in the open, POL dumps, stationary armored vehicles and tanks, unhardened radar and communication facilities, exposed personnel, and warehouses of combustible construction.

(2) Napalm B. Napalm B, the newest incendigel mix, provides increased burning times and improved terminal effects. It is a mixture of polystyrene, benzene, and low octane gasoline. Napalm B is more viscous than other incedigel mixes which improves its adherence to target surfaces and reduces the "fire ball" effect. It burns for up to 10 minutes.

ROCKETS

a. General. The 2.75" folding fin aerial rocket (FFAR) was originally designed for air-to-air use, but is now used as an air-to-ground antipersonnel and materiel munition. Several different warheads can be installed. The rockets can be carried in two different launchers. The LAU-59 is a reusable launcher that carries 7 rockets. The LAU-3 carries 19 rockets and is jettisoned after firing.

b. Warheads.

(1) MK 1 (HE). The high explosive head produces blast and fragmentation. Detonation of the MK 1 head ejects 750 fragments with an average velocity of 3780 feet per second. These fragments are capable of penetrating 1/8" of mild steel at a distance of 30 feet from the point of detonation. When firing against targets on soft ground, most of the rocket fragmentation will probably be absorbed since warhead fuzing will allow the head to penetrate the ground prior to detonation. Lethal radius for a single rocket against men standing is 20' and for men prone is 12'.

(2) MK 5 (HEAT). The high-explosive antitank warhead, with its specially designed shaped charge, is capable of penetrating up to six inches of armor with an impact normal (90°) to the surface. The weapon will have a negligible effect unless a direct hit is obtained.

(3) M151 (HEAP). This high-explosive antipersonnel warhead has a "super-quick" fuze which causes detonation prior to penetration of the head into soil or sand. Lethal radius for a single rocket against men standing is 39 feet and for men prone is 26 feet.

(4) WDU-4A/A (Flechette). This antipersonnel warhead contains 2400 twenty grain flechettes which are expelled from the warhead at motor burn out. The flechettes resemble small darts and inflict casualties by virtue of their high energy level at impact. Foliage degrades the effectiveness of flechettes and they should not be used under jungle canopy. Flechettes have very limited capabilities against materiel or shielded personnel. The following table shows pattern sizes for various delivery parameters:

Dive Angle	Altitude AGL (Feet)	Pattern Width and Length (Feet) 10°	800	300 x 1200
20°	1400	300 x 1200
30°	2200	250 x 250
30°	3000	400 x 500
45°	3600	250 x 300
45°	5000	400 x 500

(5) M156WP. The warhead contains 2.0 lbs of white phosphorous (WP) and 2.0 ounces of B-4 high explosive. Upon detonation, the high explosive ruptures the warhead and dispenses the WP to generate a white cloud of smoke.

c. Delivery Accuracy. All fighter aircraft deliver rockets from a dive, with angles varying from 10° to 45°. The following table provides an estimate of combat delivery accuracies for rockets:

Type	Dive Angle	Knots True Airspeed	Alt AGL	REP-Feet	DEP-Feet	CEP-Feet
HEAT	30°	500	2400	105	40	130
HEAP	30°	500	2400	10540	130
WDU-4A/A	30°	500	2400	105 40	130

B-57 munitions. (USAF Museum)

DISPENSER MUNITIONS.

a. General.

There is a large group of munitions designated as cluster bomb units (CBU) which consist of a dispenser (SUU-XX) matched with a bomblet (BLU-XX). The complete round is designated a CBU. For example, CBU-24B/B = SUU-30B/B + BLU-26/A. These munitions produce a wide variety of effects, to include antimateriel, antipersonnel, area denial, and chemical riot control. The dispenser has the capability to distribute its payload widely, thereby spreading the effectiveness of the munition over a large area instead of concentrating the destructive energy in one small area which can result in near misses or over-kills.

b. Delivery.

(1) CBU-24/49. The CBU-24/49 consists of a clam shell dispenser which opens into two hemispherical halves, allowing the bombs to fall free and disperse in a somewhat elliptical pattern. CBU-24/49's are normally delivered from a dive (25° - 45°; 5000' - 8000') at high speeds (up to 550k depending on aircraft) but may be delivered from level flight or dive toss. A CBU-24/49 pattern size is about 530x530 meters for a single dispenser but may be considerably larger if premature opening occurs. The pattern for a single dispenser normally has an area within the pattern itself that is not covered by bomblets. This is known as the "donut" effect and the size of the hole is dependent upon dispenser opening altitude. This munition is not intended for use near friendly forces.

(2) Rearward and Downward Dispensing CBU's. These CBU's comprise a major portion of our CBU inventory (i.e., CBU14, 25, 33, 42, 46). They are normally delivered from level flight at relatively low (50'-500') altitudes and high (up to 600 knots depending on aircraft) speeds because of dispenser and optical sighting system limitations, and because this mode of delivery produces the best dispersion patterns. A-1's however, may deliver these CBU's from a dive. The resulting patterns are normally long and narrow. The length of the patterns will depend on the type of dispenser used, number of bomb button depressions during the attack, number of tubes released per depression and release airspeed. A normal CBU pattern is about 30x400 meters. Delivery can be conducted under 800'-1000' ceilings and with visibilities of 2-4 miles. The delivery should be parallel to friendly formations, with positions well marked. Delivery of CBU-25's and CBU-46's should be with the friendly forces on the right side of the aircraft to compensate for the left drift of the bomblets. Caution must be exercised in the vicinity of friendly troops near the ends of the CBU pattern, since delayed releases may extend patterns beyond desired areas. Additionally, aircraft should never fly over friendly positions once they have initiated CBU passes because some bomblets may dribble from the dispensers. The following table provides an estimate of combat delivery accuracies for CBU munitions.

Munition	Aircraft Angle	KTAS Altitude AGL	REP-Feet	DEP-Feet	CEP-Feet
CBU-24/49	All	45°	500	4500	175	130	265
Rearward	All	0°	450	100	100		40 120 Downward	All	0°	450	300	250	70	280

20mm AMMUNITION.

a. General. 20mm ammunition may consist of high explosive incendiary (HEI) or armor-Piercing incendiary (API). The HEI projectile causes damage by blast, fragmentation and incendiary effects. At short range, HEI is effective against targets, such as vehicles, which can be penetrated due to the high striking velocity, and then destroyed by internal functioning of the explosive round. Against light vehicles, HEI is about twice as effective as API. HEI fragmentation makes it very effective against personnel. The API projectile Is designed for use against armored targets, and functions with a combined penetration and incendiary effect. Against hard targets such as locomotives and armored vehicles, HEI blast is absorbed by the target surface and the deeper penetrating API round is preferred. API produces no lethal fragments and is not effective against personnel for other than a direct hit.b. Delivery. The following table provides estimated delivery accuracies for 20mm.

Aircraft	Dive Angle	KTAS	Slant range (Feet)	CEP-Feet
All	5-15°	400-500	2000	28
All	5-15°	400-500	3000	42

7.62mm AMMUNITION.

7.62mm ammunition may consist of ball or tracer rounds. The ball round is intended for use against personnel or materiel targets.

WEAPONS MINIMUM SAFE DISTANCES.

Minimum safe distances from various. weapons should be provided to both the FAC directing the airstrike and the ground commander requesting an airstrike close to his forces. It is not intended here to present all the factors affecting weapons delivery accuracy; however, consideration of expected delivery accuracy, weapon lethal radius, and target identification error should provide a minimum safe distance for initial munition delivery. These distances can be reduced. but the ground commander must make that decision based upon his estimate of the immediate situation. The following table shows the minimum safe distances from unprotected troops for delivery of ordnance. The distances listed represent the range at which a fragment from the particular munition will not penetrate the skin of an individual standing in an open field. The figures are based on a probability of kill of zero (Pk=0). They do not take into account aiming errors, pattern length, or pattern dispersions. The distances are from the actual point of impact. For the BLU-3/B and the BLU-26/59/B, the figure represents the actual point of impact of a single bomblet from the CBU dispenser. The safe distance for rockets is measured from the actual point of impact for a single 2.75" FFAR. The table also shows the minimum safe distances from protected troops that various types of ordnance may be delivered. The distances offer reasonable casualty-free risk for troops in armored vehicles, bunkers, trenches, or fox holes who are shielded from the point of detonation. They are based on 150% expected delivery accuracy, 200% lethal radius, 60 meters target identification error for high angle delivery, and 30 meters for low angle delivery.

Minimum Safe Distances (Meters) Weapon Type	Protected Troops	Unprotected Troops
M118 (3000#)	250	1174
MK 84 (2000#)	250	720
M117 (750#) low drag	215	830
M117 (750#) high drag	160	830
MK 82 (500#) low drag	225	700
MK 82 (500#) high drag	170	700
MK 81 (250#)	215	620
Napalm	115	---
CBU (except CBU 24/49)	110	250
CBU 24/49	1000	1000
Rockets	215	215
Cannons and gun (20mm, 7.62mm)	45	---

Close Air Support According to the WPAFB Museum: A-X Close Air Support Project, "During the Vietnam War, it became clear that the USAF was in need of a dedicated CAS aircraft. Many aircraft were used successfully in the CAS/ground attack role in Vietnam, but all had limitations. For example, the Douglas A-1 and LTV A-7 (Corsair II) were used effectively; however, the A-1 were getting old and the A-7 didn't have the maneuverability to operate at low altitudes in confined areas. A number of fighters (and fighter-bombers) were used also. The McDonnell Douglas F-4, North American F-100, Republic F-105 and General Dynamics F-111 were all moderately effective ground attack aircraft, but like the A-7, lacked the maneuverability to operate in very close proximity to friendly troops under enemy attack. A number of cargo aircraft were modified for use as side firing gunships. The Douglas AC-47, Fairchild AC-119 and Lockheed AC-130 were used very effectively in the interdiction and ground attack roles, particularly at night. Finally, the USAF used some modified trainer aircraft in the counter insurgency and ground attack roles, two examples are the North American T-28 and Cessna A-37 (T-37)." (NOTE: The A-1E Skyraiders were Korean War vintage Navy AD-5s taken out of mothballs and redesignated for USAF use as a ground attack workhorse. The A-7D Corsair II was strictly ground attack.)

The following is excerpted from A-37 Association:

The Dragonfly pulled alert duty at Bien Hoa Air Base (about 30 miles from Saigon) and from there was able to reach into most of the southern areas of South Viet Nam. It flew both day and night missions in visual meteorological conditions.

The moderate speed of the aircraft gave it much greater accuracy than other fighters of that time. The speed caused experienced enemy gunners to overlead the aircraft and shoot in front of it. The A-37's small size also reduced its vulnerability and increased survivability. It did not go through the war without losses, but its survivability surprised many. (SITE NOTE: During their operational stay in Vietnam the USAF A-37B units lost 16 aircraft to enemy fire of which 14 were destroyed on the ground during rocket and mortar attacks.)

One of the few aircraft made with an unusual ability, it could carry its own weight. This meant a combat configuration of 4 Mk82 500 lb bombs, 2 pods of rockets, and a load of gun ammo. This was equivalent to the load carried by the F-100 Super Saber (not counting the 20MM gun). (SITE NOTE: The empty weight of the A-37B was 6,254 lb, while its full-up combat takeoff weight was 14,000 lb.) In close range missions, the A-37 could actually get bombs on target faster than the F-100 since the "Hun" had to burn off some fuel before it could go to work. It could also hit the target, climb up to pattern altitude and return to make another pass quicker than any other fighter.

"Close Air Support (or CAS) missions were probably the most demanding flown by FACs in Southeast Asia. Working a troops in contact (TIC) situation required the airborne FAC to coordinate with the ground commander, strike aircraft and command and control agencies on three different radios (UHF for fighters, VHF for command and control and FM for the ground troops). While doing this he had to maintain visual contact with the friendly forces and attacking aircraft, locate and mark targets and avoid hostile ground fire.

It continued, "At times there were mismatches between the tactical situation and the ordnance available on the fighter. The Rules of Engagement were always there to "guide" you, but when the chips were down common sense and your gut always were the best guides. The knowledge that you were directing the use of deadly munitions in close proximity to friendly forces whose lives depended on you was a constant motivator. Throw in mountainous terrain, smoke, bad weather and darkness, and a normally demanding mission would become even more exciting. No two were ever the same."

"But despite the GIs' confusion, international law enjoins armies to avoid targeting any but military objectives and assures protection to civilians, in almost any circumstance. Free fire zones as defined by Department of Defense doctrine and the rules of engagement are a severe violation of the laws of war for two reasons. First, they violate the rule against direct attack of civilians by presuming that after civilians are warned to vacate a zone, then anyone still present may lawfully be attacked. The rule prohibiting direct attacks on civilians provides no basis for a party to a conflict to shift the burden by declaring a whole zone to be "civilian free." And second, they violate the rule against indiscriminate attack by presuming without justification in the law that warning civilians to leave eliminates the legal requirements to discriminate in targeting its weapons."

It went on, "Faced with this negative coverage and with severe difficulty in enforcing international laws limiting the imposition of free fire zones, as well as other elements of the rules of engagement, the Pentagon over time added more directives to its pocket cards: a village could not be bombed without warning even if American troops had received fire from within it; a village known to be Communist could be attacked only if its inhabitants were warned in advance; only once civilians had been removed could a village be declared a free fire zone and shelled at will." The bottom line was that the Rules of War was completely ineffective in Vietnam.

The article continued, "Toward the end of the 1960s, the term free fire zone itself was dropped from the U.S. military lexicon in no small part because that doctrine embraced actions that the United States today would regard as illegal. Subsequent U.S. military manuals and rules of engagement, whether for ground, air, or naval forces, tend to track quite closely with the central principle of international humanitarian law on civilian immunity and the prohibition on the targeting of civilians."

The CBU-19 chemical cluster was a 130-lb. modified U.S. Army dispenser intended for use on helicopters and consisted of two subclusters fitted to a strongback. Each cluster contained 528 agent-filled canisters; each canister contained an incapacitating chemical, called CS, and a pyrotechnic fuze. Upon ejection from the aircraft, the fuze ignited the CS, disseminating the CS for four to six seconds. This required delivery below 600 feet AGL [above ground level] to insure that the chemical reached the ground. Also, as the cluster had originally been designed for use on helicopters, delivery was restricted to use on the A-1 and A-37 because the cluster could not withstand the airloads encountered on faster aircraft. The CBU-30 consisted of the SUU-13 downward ejection dispenser and 1,280 BLU-39/B23 submunitions, each filled with CS. Upon ejection, a pyrotechnic fuze in each submunition ignited, disseminating the agent into the air. Delivery was restricted to below 600 feet AGL to insure ground coverage. Upon contact with the ground, the submunitions skittered about, disseminating the CS even further. The CBU-30 was compatible with both low and high speed aircraft.

An account with an A-1 Skyraider using tear gas shows its effectiveness. On 15 February 1969, A-1 Skyraiders flew a SAR mission near the Laos-South Vietnam border and dropped CBU-19s. It continued: "Braving the constant hail of antiaircraft fire, the Skyraiders made the required mile-long run at 300 feet and 220 knots to hit all their targets--enemy antiaircraft gun positions. While the gunners choked, coughed, cried, and retched uncontrollably, a Jolly Green [helicopter] with its crew wearing gas masks swooped in and saved the pilot."

A-37B SuperTweet Model (Academy Hobby Models)
NOTE: "EK" Tail Designator (96359/EK, 8th SOS, 14th SOW, USAF, Bien Hoa AB, Vietnam, 1970) We believe that 8th SOS/14th SOW is in error and should be 8th SOS/35th TFW.

A-37 Call Signs

The call signs for the A-37s Strike Aircraft at Bien Hoa is listed in the 619th TCS Training Manual (about 1969-70) at 505th Tactical Control Group. The aircraft at Bien Hoa are listed below:

Call Sign	Type Aircraft	Base
1. Hawk	F-100	Bien Hoa
2. Hawk	A-37	Bien Hoa
3. Ramrod	F-100	Bien Hoa
4. Dice	A-37	Bien Hoa
5. Rap	A-37	Bien Hoa
6. Falcon	F-5 (VNAF)	Bien Hoa
7. Dog	A-37	Bien Hoa

"Rap" was the 604th ACS; "Dice" was the 90th AS; and ""Dog" was the 8th AS. However, the entry for "2. Hawk" is confusing as no other A-37 existed at Bien Hoa at the time -- and "Hawk" was actually an F-100 call sign. The only explanation was that this was part of the planning process for the creation of the 8th SOS, 35th TFW.

Sources from Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA)

B-57: 8th TBS & 13th TBS (See A-37 Source for 35th TFW)

(SOURCE: AFHRA: 8th SOS: ASSIGNMENTS: 405th Fighter Wing, 18 Nov 1964 (attached to 33d Tactical Group, 18–28 Jun 1965; 2d Air Division, 28 Jun–7 Jul 1965; 6252d Tactical Fighter Wing, 8 Jul–15 Aug 1965, 16 Oct–16 Dec 1965 and 15 Feb–7 Apr 1966; 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, 8–18 Apr 1966, 15 Jun–15 Aug 1966, 12 Oct–12 Dec 1966, 11 Feb–12 Apr 1967, 7 Jun–2 Aug 1967, and 26 Sep–21 Nov 1967);
STATIONS: 17 Nov 1960 (deployed at Clark AB, Philippines, 9–23 Apr 1964); Clark AB, Philippines, 24 Apr 1964 (deployed at Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 5 Aug–3 Nov 1964; Tan Son Nhut AB, South Vietnam, 18–28 Jun 1965; Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, 28 Jun–15 Aug 1965, 16 Oct–16 Dec 1965, 15 Feb–18 Apr 1966, and 15 Jun–15 Aug 1966; Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 12 Oct–12 Dec 1966, 11 Feb–12 Apr 1967, 7 Jun–2 Aug 1967, and 26 Sep–22 Nov 1967); Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 17 Jan 1968; Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 15 Nov 1969; Clark AB, Philippines, 1 Oct 1972–1 Mar 1974;

(SOURCE: AFHRA: 13 BS: ASSIGNMENTS: 3 Bombardment Wing, 25 Oct 1957 (attached to 41 Air Division, 1 Sep 1963-7 Jan 1964); 41 Air Division, 8 Jan 1964; Thirteenth Air Force, c. 10 Apr 1964 (attached to 405 Fighter Wing, 10 Apr- 17 Nov 1964); 405 Fighter Wing, 18 Nov 1964-15 Jan 1968 (attached to: 2 Air Division, 5 Aug-3 Nov 1964 and 17 Feb-21 Jun 1965; 6252 Tactical Fighter Wing, 16 Aug-16 Oct 1965 and 16 Dec 1965-17 Feb 1966; 35 Tactical Fighter Wing, 17 Apr-17 Jun 1966, 14 Aug-13 Oct 1966, 12 Dec 1966-11 Feb 1967, 11 Apr-8 Jun 1967, 1 Aug-26 Sep 1967, and 21 Nov 1967-15 Jan 1968).
STATIONS: Clark AB, Philippines, 10 Apr 1964-15 Jan 1968 (deployed at Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 5 Aug-3 Nov 1964, 17 Feb-16 May 1965; Tan Son Nhut AB, South Vietnam, 16 May-21 Jun 1965; Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, 16 Aug- 16 Oct 1965, 16 Dec 1965-17 Feb 1966, 17 Apr- 17 Jun 1966 [operated from Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 15-22 May 1966], 14 Aug-9 Oct 1966; Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 10- 13 Oct 1966, 12 Dec 1966-11 Feb 1967, 11 Apr-8 Jun 1967, 1 Aug- 26 Sep 1967, 21 Nov 1967-15 Jan 1968).

---

8th SOS, 90th SOS and 604th ACS -- 3rd TFW, 14th SOS, 35th TFW

SOURCE: AFHRA: 90th FS LINEAGE: 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron on 8 Jun 1964; 90th Attack Squadron on 12 Dec 1969; 90th Special Operations Squadron on 31 Oct 1970; 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron on 8 Jul 1973; 90th Fighter Squadron on 26 Sep 1991.ASSIGNMENTS: 3d Tactical Fighter Wing, c. 8 Feb 1966; 14th Special Operations Wing, 31 Oct 1970; 483d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 Sep 1971; 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 Apr 1972; 405th Fighter Wing, 15 Dec 1972; 3d Tactical Fighter Wing, 16 Sep 1974; STATIONS: Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 12 Feb 1966 (deployed at Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 9–14 Apr 1967); Nha Trang AB, South Vietnam, 31 Oct 1970; Kadena AB, Okinawa (later, Japan), 15 Apr 1972; Clark AB, Philippines, 15 Dec 1972;

SOURCE: AFHRA: 8th SOS LINEAGE: 8th Bombardment Squadron, Tactical, on 1 Oct 1955; 8th Attack Squadron on 18 Nov 1969; 8th Special Operations Squadron on 30 Sep 1970; 8th Fighter Squadron on 1 Jul 1973; 8th Special Operations Squadron on 1 Mar 1974ASSIGNMENTS: 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 Jan 1968 (attached to 405th Fighter Wing, 15–17 Jan 1968); 3d Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 Nov 1969; 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, 30 Sep 1970 (attached to 315th Tactical Airlift Wing, 16–30 Jul 1971); 315th Tactical Airlift Wing, 31 Jul 1971; 377th Air Base Group (later, 377th Air Base Wing), 15 Jan 1972 (attached to 6251st Air Base Squadron, 1–14 Sep 1972; Detachment 2, 377th Air Base Wing, 15–30 Sep 1972); 405th Fighter Wing, 1 Oct 1972; 1st Special Operations (later, 834th Tactical Composite; 1st Special Operations) Wing, 1 Jul 1974; 1st Special Operations (later 16th Operations) Group, 22 Sep 1992–.STATIONS: Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 17 Jan 1968; Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 15 Nov 1969; Clark AB, Philippines, 1 Oct 1972–1 Mar 1974;

SOURCE: AFHRA: 3rd WingASSIGNMENTS: Seventh Air Force, 1 Apr 1966; Fifth Air Force, 15 Mar 1971; 314th Air Division, 15 Mar 1971; Thirteenth Air Force, 16 Sep 1974; Eleventh Air Force, 19 Dec 1991–.
SQUADRONS: 1st Air Commando (later, 1st Special Operations): attached 21 Nov 1965–8 Mar 1966; assigned 15 Jan 1981–1 Mar 1983. 1st Test: 16 Sep 1974–1 Jan 1980 (detached 15 Mar 1979–1 Jan 1980). 3d Tactical Electronic Warfare Training: 15 May 1976–1 Jan 1980. 3d Tactical Fighter: 15 Dec 1975–19 Dec 1991 (detached 15–16 Dec 1975). 7th Airborne Command and Control: 31 Mar–14 Aug 1975 (detached). 8th Bombardment (later, 8th Attack): attached 13 Aug 1956–24 Oct 1957, assigned 25 Oct 1957–8 Jan 1964 (detached 1 Sep 1963–8 Jan 1964); assigned 15 Nov 1969–30 Sep 1970. 8th Tactical Reconnaissance: attached 18 Apr 1949–1 Apr 1950. 10th Fighter: 8 Apr 1966–17 Apr 1967. 13th Bombardment: attached 13 Aug 1956–24 Oct 1957, assigned 25 Oct 1957–8 Jan 1964 (detached 1 Sep 1963– 8 Jan 1964). 20th Operations: 16 Sep 1974–31 Mar 1975. 25th Tactical Fighter: 18–19 Dec 1975. 26th Tactical Fighter (later, 26th Tactical Fighter Training; 26th Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor; 26th Aggressor): 16 Sep 1974–1 Oct 1988. 35th Tactical Fighter: 15 Mar 1971–16 Sep 1974 (detached 1 Apr–12 Oct 1972). 36th Tactical Fighter: 15 May 1971–16 Sep 1974. 40th Fighter-Interceptor: attached 1 Dec 1961–31 May 1962. 44th Tactical Fighter: attached 3 Apr–2 Jun 1972 and 28 Jul–8 Sep 1972. 67th Tactical Fighter: attached 2 Jun–28 Jul 1972 and 8 Sep–16 Oct 1972. 68th Tactical Fighter: 16 Sep 1974–30 Sep 1975. 80th Tactical Fighter: 15 Mar 1971–16 Sep 1974. 90th Bombardment (later, 90th Tactical Fighter; 90th Attack; 90th Tactical Fighter): attached 13 Aug 1956–24 Oct 1957, assigned 25 Oct 1957–8 Jan 1964 (detached 1 Sep 1963–8 Jan 1964); assigned 9 Jun 1964–19 Nov 1965 (detached 3 Feb–10 May 1965 and 3 Aug–19 Nov 1965); assigned 3 Feb 1966–31 Oct 1970; assigned 16 Sep 1974–29 May 1991. 307th Tactical Fighter: attached 21 Nov–6 Dec 1965. 308th Tactical Fighter: 2 Dec 1965–25 Dec 1966 (detached 15 Nov–25 Dec 1966). 310th Attack:15–30 Nov 1969. 311th Attack: 15 Nov–15 Dec 1969. 416th Tactical Fighter: 16 Jun 1964–8 Nov 1965 (detached 14 Mar–21 Jul 1965); 16 Nov 1965– 15 Apr 1967 (detached 16 Nov 1965–15 Jun 1966). 421st Air Refueling: attached 21 Nov 1960–1 Jun 1962. 429th Tactical Fighter: attached c. 21 Nov–14 Dec 1965. 510th Tactical Fighter: 16 Mar 1964–15 Nov 1969 (detached 5 May–c. 20 Aug 1965). 531st Tactical Fighter: 16 Jun 1964– 19 Nov 1965 (detached 2 Nov 1964–18 Mar 1965); 7 Dec 1965–31 Jul 1970. 602d Fighter: attached 21 Nov 1965–8 Mar 1966. 604th Air Commando (later, 604th Special Operations): attached 15 Nov 1967–1 Mar 1970, assigned 1 Mar–30 Sep 1970. 731st Bombardment: attached 1 Dec 1950– 25 Jun 1951. 6091st Reconnaissance: attached 21 Nov 1960–c. 5 Jun 1962. STATIONS: England AFB, LA, 8 Jan 1964–Nov 1965; Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 8 Nov 1965; Kunsan AB, South Korea, 15 Mar 1971; Clark AB, Philippines, 16 Sep 1974–19 Dec 1991; Elmendorf AFB, AK, 19 Dec 1991–.
OPERATIONS (EXCERPT): After the Korean war, the wing participated successively in bombardment, air defense, reconnaissance, and air refueling training. Its headquarters was non-operational 1 Sep 1963 to 8 Jan 1964. Moved to the United States without personnel or equipment in Jan 1964, then trained and rotated its squadrons in detached status to Southeast Asia for combat duty. Moved in Nov 1965 to Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam, a forward operating base which frequently came under enemy mortar and rocket fire.Missions included close air support, counterinsurgency, forward air control, interdiction, and radar-controlled bombing. Supported numerous ground operations with strike missions against enemy fortifications, supply areas, lines of communication and personnel, in addition to suppressing fire in landing areas. During this time, wing also participated in combat evaluation of F–5 and A–37 aircraft. Unmanned and unequipped on 31 Oct 1970, the wing remained active in a "paper" status until it moved to South Korea on 15 Mar 1971, to be manned and equipped with F–4 aircraft.

SOURCE: AFHRA: 14th Flying Training WingASSIGNMENTS: Pacific Air Forces, 28 Feb 1966; 2d Air Division, 8 Mar 1966; Seventh Air Force, 1 Apr 1966–30 Sep 1971. Air Training Command, 1 Jun 1972; Nineteenth Air Force, 1 Jul 1993–.
SQUADRONS: 1st: 8 Mar 1966–20 Dec 1967. 3d: 1 May 1968–15 Sep 1969. 4th: 8 Mar 1966–15 Dec 1969. 5th: 8 Mar 1966–15 Oct 1969. 6th: 29 Feb– 15 Jul 1968. 9th: 25 Jan 1967–30 Sep 1971. 14th: 25 Oct 1967–1 May 1968. 15th: 15 Mar 1968–31 Oct 1970. 17th: 1 Jun 1969–30 Sep 1971. 18th: 1 Oct 1969–25 Aug 1971. 20th: 8 Mar 1966–1 Sep 1971. 37th: 1 Jun 1972–15 Dec 1991. 43d: 25 Jun 1990–15 Dec 1991. 49th: 25 Jun 1990–15 Dec 1991. 50th: 1 Jun 1972–15 Dec 1991. 71st: 20 Dec 1968–10 Jun 1969. 90th: 31 Oct 1970–1 Sep 1971. 602d: 8 Mar 1966–8 Apr 1967. 604th: 15 Nov 1967– 1 Mar 1970 (detached). STATIONS: Nha Trang AB, South Vietnam, 8 Mar 1966; Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 15 Oct 1969–30 Sep 1971. Columbus AFB, MS, 1 Jun 1972–.OPERATIONS (EXCERPT): Performed combat operations in Southeast Asia, Mar 1966–Sep 1971, operating from numerous locations in South Vietnam and Thailand. Operations included close and direct air support, interdiction, combat airlift, aerial resupply, visual and photographic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, psychological warfare (including leaflet dropping and aerial broadcasting), forward air control operations and FAC escort, search and rescue, escort for convoy and defoliation operations, flare drops, civic actions, and humanitarian actions. The wing also operated Nha Trang AB, South Vietnam, Mar 1966–Oct 1969, and provided maintenance support for a number of tenants. Trained South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) personnel in AC–119 operations and maintenance, Feb–Aug 1971, and transferred some of its AC–119s to the VNAF, Aug–Sep 1971 as part of a phase-down for inactivation.

SOURCE: AFHRA: 35th FWASSIGNMENTS: Pacific Air Forces, 14 Mar 1966; Seventh Air Force, 8 Apr 1966–31 Jul 1971. Twelfth Air Force, 1 Oct 1971; Tactical Training, George, 1 Oct 1977; 831st Air Division, 1 Dec 1980; Twelfth Air Force, 31 Mar 1991–15 Dec 1992. First Air Force 31 May 1993; Eighth Air Force, 1 Oct 1993–1 Oct 1994. Fifth Air Force, 1 Oct 1994–.
SQUADRONS: 2 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force: attached c. 19 Apr 1967– 4 Jun 1971. 8th Bombardment, Tactical (later, 8th Special Operations): attached 8–18 Apr 1966, 15 Jun–15 Aug 1966, 12 Oct–12 Dec 1966, 11 Feb– 12 Apr 1967, 7 Jun–2 Aug 1967, 26 Sep–21 Nov 1967; assigned 15 Jan 1968–15 Nov 1969; assigned 30 Sep 1970–31 Jul 1971 (detached c. 16–31 Jul 1971). 8th Tactical Reconnaissance: attached 1 Apr–14 Aug 1950. 13th Bombardment, Tactical: attached 17 Apr–17 Jun 1966, 14 Aug–13 Oct 1966, 12 Dec 1966–11 Feb 1967, 11 Apr–8 Jun 1967, 1 Aug–26 Sep 1967, 21 Nov 1967–15 Jan 1968. 20th Tactical Fighter Training (later, 20th Fighter): 1 Dec 1972–8 Jul 1992. 21st Tactical Fighter Training (later, 21st Tactical Fighter; 21st Tactical Fighter Training): 1 Dec 1972–28 Jun 1991. 39th Fighter-Interceptor (later, 39th Tactical Fighter Training; 39th Tactical Fighter): attached 8 Oct 1956–1 Jul 1957; assigned 1 Jul 1977–11 May 1984. 40th Fighter-Interceptor (later, 40th Tactical Fighter): attached 15 Jan–14 Jul 1954 and 8 Oct 1956–1 Jul 1957; assigned 1 Jun 1972–30 Apr 1982. 41st Fighter-Interceptor: attached 9 Jul–1 Dec 1950 and 15 Jan–14 Jul 1954. 77 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force: attached 1 Dec 1950–6 Apr 1951. 120th Tactical Fighter: 30 Apr 1968–18 Apr 1969. 319th Fighter-Interceptor: attached 17 Aug–1 Oct 1954. 339th Fighter (later, 339th Fighter-Interceptor): attached 1 Jul 1949–1 Dec 1950 and 25 May 1951–20 Jul 1954. 352d Tactical Fighter: 10 Oct 1966–31 Jul 1971. 390th Tactical Fighter: 8 Apr–10 Oct 1966. 431st Tactical Fighter Training: 15 Jan 1976–1 Oct 1978. 434th Tactical Fighter (later, 434th Tactical Fighter Training): 1 Oct 1971–1 Jan 1977 (detached 12 Aug–6 Oct 1972). 480th Tactical Fighter: attached 8 Apr–22 Jun 1966, assigned 23 Jun–10 Oct 1966. 561st Tactical Fighter (later, 561st Fighter):attached 1–14 Jul 1973, assigned 15 Jul 1973–30 Mar 1981; 5 Oct 1989– 30 Jun 1992 (detached Aug 1990–Mar 1991). 562d Tactical Fighter (later, 562d Tactical Fighter Training; 562d Fighter): 31 Oct 1974–30 Mar 1981 (detached 12–30 Aug 1977); 5 Oct 1989–30 Jun 1992. 563d Tactical Fighter Training (later, 563d Tactical Fighter): 31 Jul 1975–30 Mar 1981. 612th Tactical Fighter: 15 Mar–31 Jul 1971. 614th Tactical Fighter: 10 Oct 1966– 31 Jul 1971. 615th Tactical Fighter: 10 Oct 1966–31 Jul 1971. 4435th Combat Crew Training: 1 Oct 1971–1 Dec 1972. 4435th Tactical Fighter Replacement: 1 Oct 1971–15 Jan 1976. 4452d Combat Crew Training: 1 Oct 1971–1 Dec 1972. Detachment. Det 1, 612th Tactical Fighter Squadron: attached 10 Oct 1966–8 Jan 1967 and 14 Apr 1969–15 Mar 1971. STATIONS: Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, 8 Apr 1966; Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, 10 Oct 1966–31 Jul 1971. George AFB, CA, 1 Oct 1971–15 Dec 1992. Keflavik NAS, Iceland, 31 May 1993–1 Oct 1994. Misawa AB, Japan, 1 Oct 1994–.
OPERATIONS (EXCERPT): From 1 Jul until inactivated on 1 Oct 1957, the wing was a "paper" unit, its units controlled by 41st Air Division. Organized again in Apr 1966 at Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, replacing the 6252d Tactical Fighter Wing. Controlled two F–4C squadrons, two rotational B–57 squadrons, and F–102 flights of the 64th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, to conduct combat operations in Southeast Asia. On 1 Oct 1966 the 35th and 366th Wings moved in name only, the 35th Wing replacing the 366th Wing at Phan Rang AB, South Vietnam, and becoming an F–100 organization. The two B–57 squadrons also shifted bases, following the 35th Wing to Phan Rang. Missions included air support of ground forces, interdiction, visual and armed reconnaissance, strike assessment photography, escort, close and direct air support, and rapid reaction alert. Struck enemy bases and supply caches in Parrot’s Beak just inside the Cambodian border, Apr–May 1970. Provided close air support and interdiction in support of South Vietnamese operations in Laos and Cambodia, Jan–Jun 1971. Also attached to the wing at Phan Rang was RAAF Squadron No. 2, equipped with MK–20 Canberra bombers, which provided day and night bombing, photo strike assessment, and close air support primarily for 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province. Another attached component, actually a de facto squadron, was the F–100-equipped Detachment 1, 612th TFS. On 15 Mar 1971, the 612th moved from Japan to Phan Rang in name only, replacing the detachment. Gained an A–37B squadron (8th SOS) in Sep 1970. Began phasing down for inactivation in Apr 1971, standing down from operations on 26 Jun 1971. Remaining resources passed to the 315th Tactical Airlift Wing on 31 Jul 1971 when the 35th Wing inactivated. A few months later, the 35th Wing activated at George AFB, CA, replacing the 479th Tactical Fighter Wing.

---

GO TO AFTER VIETNAM: 8th SOS

---

For inputs or comments, contact Kalani O'Sullivan.

NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there.

---

You are listening to CCR: Bad Moon Rising Return to Top

28 October 2003

---

For inputs or comments, contact Kalani O'Sullivan.

NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there.

---

Copyright 2003 - All Rights Reserved
email to: kalani@hanvit.com

---

FastCounter by bCentral